


THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN


A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy



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The New Morality

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THE late President Woodrow Wilson, in an address delivered in London in 1919, said: "I firmly believe in Divine Providence. Without belief in Providence, I think that I should go crazy. Without God the world would be a maze without a clue." True words are these and in accord with experience as well as with sound philosophy.

"God's in His heaven—
All's right with the world!"

Divine Providence is the execution of God's Eternal Law, that plan of Divine Wisdom which directs everything to its proper end in conformity with its nature. Man, therefore, must be guided by a moral law rather than by physical laws which would destroy free will. Divine Providence and the Moral Law, divine and unchangeable, stand firm together. Arthur Balfour put this truth in a few

words when he said: "Ethics is rooted in the divine and in the divine finds its consummation."

The exponents of the New Morality, unlike Wilson and Balfour, speak of the moral code as purely human and changeable. As they view it, it is a mere summation of human conventions that are as changeable as the tides and the fashions. As this involves a complete break with the past, a brief study of the traditional code of morals will help us to understand better the meaning of the New Morality.

In the traditional morality the moral law is divine. God is essentially bound up with morality. He is man's ultimate end—in Him alone can perfect happiness, as a reward of virtuous conduct, be found. Those actions are called morally good which lead man to his ultimate end; those are morally bad which draw him away from his

final goal, God and happiness. In one case, these actions conform to man's rational nature, the proximate norm of morality; in the other case, they are in difformity with that rule or measure. God's essence, as is clear, is rightly called the ultimate norm of morality.

The moral law has its origin in God,—He is the Law-giver. Its power to bind the wills of men comes from God,—He is the source of obligation. Moreover, the sanction is derived from Him, as the Divine Legislator makes the provision of rewards for the observance of the law and of punishments for its violation.

God's wisdom required that, in creating man, He should direct him towards his proper end by some kind of law. Since a physical ordination would destroy man's greatest gift, namely, his free will, and make him act necessarily, as do brute animals, this direction would have to take the form of a moral law. Such a law leaves man's physical liberty intact, but imposes upon him a moral bond to do good and avoid evil.

This moral law, according to sound reason and traditional views, is unchangeable. It comes from God's necessary will and not His free will. It is not imposed arbitrarily, but in accordance with the rational nature of human beings. Man's nature is the norm; and the Divine Lawgiver imposes just that law which is demanded by man's unchanging rational nature.

As this law has for its subject matter things intrinsically good, such as worshipping God and telling the truth, and things intrinsically evil, such as blaspheming the Creator and lying, it cannot change. It is evident that such prescriptions can never become useless or harmful. The condemnation of lying and the approval of obedience to lawful authority do not depend upon a free will. God necessarily condemns one and approves the other.

Moreover, as God, man's ultimate end, is essentially unchangeable, and man, who is to be conducted to his last end, is, as far, at least, as his specific rational nature is concerned, the same to-day as he was centuries ago, so *the means*, namely, the moral law, by the observance of which rational beings attain their final goal, God and perfect happiness, must remain unchanged amid the changing years. If this law, intrinsically immutable, as we have seen, were to be changed, God Himself, Who made the law, would have to change it by abrogation, derogation, or dispensation. This would mean that the Author of our nature would wish us to live in accordance with our rational nature and then by altering the natural law would not wish us to shape our conduct in accordance with our rational nature. As this involves a contradiction we must admit that the moral law, intrinsically unchangeable, as our reasoning showed, is also extrinsically immutable.

Blackstone unhesitatingly accepts this view of moral law common to all who defend the traditional morality:

"There are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil to which the Creator himself in all His dispensations, conforms; and which He has enabled human nature to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions."¹

Cicero, speaking of this law says:

"There shall no longer be one law at Rome and another at Athens, nor shall it prescribe one thing today and another tomorrow, but one and the same law, eternal and immutable, shall be prescribed for all nations and all times, and the God Who shall prescribe, introduce, and promulgate this law shall be the one common Lord and Supreme Ruler of all, and whosoever shall refuse obedience to Him shall be filled with confusion, as this very act will be a virtual denial of his human nature; and should he escape a present punishment he shall endure heavy chastisement hereafter."²

Scholastic philosophy's concept of a divine and immutable moral law is in full accord with the analysis of Cicero and Blackstone; but this concept is rejected by the exponents of the New Morality who set up a purely human and changing code.

Let us consider some of the statements of the exponents of the new code. Durant Drake, in his book entitled *The New Morality*, says:

"By 'the new morality' I mean the morality which, basing itself solidly upon observation of the *results* of conduct, consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind."³

How solid this norm of temporal happiness resulting from good conduct is may be gathered from the following words of James Truslow Adams, whom Drake quotes with approval:

"Youth is questioning the validity of our entire system of ethics. . . . Our ethics and their old sanctions are already in dissolution. . . . What the younger generation and the children may be called upon to do may be to make the most rapid, far-reaching, and consciously intelligent readjustment of ethical ideas to altered social structure that the race has ever been called upon to make. . . . They have inherited perhaps, the biggest mess and biggest problem that was ever bequeathed by one generation to another."⁴

Youth, it seems, questions God's commandments, and forthwith they cease to exist. From the ruins youth reconstructs the moral precepts not according to rational nature—the norm of the traditional morality—but with a new eye to pleasure, comfort and advantage. Speaking of interest and utility as opposed to morality, Secky says:

"In all nations and in all ages, the ideas of interest and utility on the one hand and virtue on the other, have been regarded by the multitude as perfectly distinct, and all languages recognize the distinction. . . . The two lines of conduct may coincide, but they are never confused, and we have not the slightest difficulty in imagining them antagonistic. Pleasure is ordinarily an accompaniment of virtue, and perfect happiness, as we saw above, is the ultimate subjective end of man; but pleasure does not constitute the norm of morality. That neither the moral law nor obligation, according to Drake, comes from God, is evident from these words:

"We have seen that obedience to a God's commands would not be a virtue, would be mere slavish obsequiousness unless we presupposed that these commands were *worthy* of our obedience. And what could possibly make them worthy but their effectiveness in producing actual, concrete, felt work in the experience of living beings? There simply is no other ultimate criterion for conduct."⁵

As God is eliminated from morality by Drake and the

(Continued on page 44)

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The Supernatural

ALTHOUGH *The Modern Schoolman* is a philosophical not a theological journal, there is need to indicate in what sense the word *supernatural* is understood when used by our contributors, particularly as it was employed in the last issue. Our use of the word differs sharply from that of contemporary non-scholastic philosophers. These latter, when they mean by "natural" anything which is perceptible to the senses, so by "supernatural" mean anything beyond the reach of the senses; they identify the supernatural with the spiritual, or with the metaphysical, or transcendent. In scholastic philosophy the natural order consists of various substances, spiritual as well as material, which make up the universe, together with all the metaphysics that can be built upon that order, and conclusions that cannot be derived from it. In a sense the natural is for us synonymous with the formal object of philosophy. Hence neither the human soul, the existence of God as a Being distinct from and superior to the world, nor religion as it is considered in philosophy is excluded from the natural order. Every human being by reason of his very constitution as a man enters into the natural order and by it is destined to the supreme beatitude which his natural powers are capable of.

The supernatural touches only man among all the beings in the visible world, and it essentially means that

man is destined to a beatitude higher than the natural beatitude described above, namely the Beatific Vision. Into this supernatural order man enters not by right of his nature but by the favor of God. Philosophy cannot pretend that God's goodness in man's regard has been exhausted in destining him to natural beatitude, and consequently cannot reasonably exclude the possibility of supernatural beatitude. Philosophy has no warrant that created nature contains the premises for all the truth in God, and consequently must admit there may be truths which human reason of itself cannot attain to. And if a supernatural destiny is possible and God has decided upon it for man, and if man is to aspire to it in a manner proper to his rational nature, then he must *know* that destiny and the means to it. But all that he cannot know without revelation. Hence the supernatural as understood by us involves revelation. Further, God's providence over man cannot be conceived as necessarily restricted to what He has committed Himself to by the mere creation of human nature; He may supplement the natural moral law by positive ordinances, the institution of a church and a whole economy of gratuitous aids in keeping with the supernatural destiny of man. At the same time there is in the natural no exigency for the supernatural, and hence, although there must be harmony between the two orders, there can be no relation of *right* but only one of *fact*. Of the fact philosophy as such has no knowledge. Revelation, philosophy can show to be possible and becoming. A supernatural destiny for man it cannot show to be impossible.

What problems arise from the fact that philosophy and Christian theology have in part the same "material object," or subject matter, namely the actual human race, Maritain and others are ably discussing at the present moment. It is not our purpose here to enter on that discussion. We merely say that a correct understanding of the Christian supernatural is essential to any reasonable grasp of scholastic philosophy and its history, and that when present-day philosophers call the merely metaphysical "supernatural," and hold it up to scorn, they are not really despising the supernatural but the natural. What is more, the Scholastics, unlike the Deists, do not represent God as remote and coldly indifferent to the affairs of men, nor yet as the grim, unfree *Ferreum Fatum*, against which, somewhat inconsistently it seems to us, Mr. Paul Elmer More protests in his *Demon of the Absolute*. The Christian concept represents God as infinitely superior to the world and at the same time as using His freedom and omnipotence to raise man to a higher and more intimate communication with the divine than mere nature could ever achieve.

Scholastic philosophy leaves to the science of apologetics and to theology the task of establishing the authenticity and determining the content of revelation; nor does it ever employ revelation as a premise for any of its conclusions. Philosophical conclusions, or theses, are based on the natural order, concern the natural order, and are the honest findings of that human reason which is common to all men, whether within or without the pale of revelation.

The New Course of Ecclesiastical Studies

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ITS ORIGIN AND GENERAL CHARACTER

ON May 24th, 1931, appeared the *Constitutio Apostolica de Universitatibus et Facultatibus Studiorum Ecclesiasticorum*,¹ which contains within the small compass of some twenty pages, the most comprehensive body of legislation on higher ecclesiastical studies that has ever issued from Rome. It was followed within a few weeks by another document of approximately equal length, that goes over the same ground, interpreting and supplementing its articles—the *Ordinationes* of the Congregation of Studies. The purpose of the new legislation is to raise the level of studies, and to "standardize" the requirements for degrees in ecclesiastical institutions. While ordinary seminaries are not directly aimed at, they are indirectly affected in a very important way, as we shall see presently.

There had been talk at Rome of some such action as this more than once in the past, but an acute consciousness of the enormous obstacles in the way always prevented anything from being undertaken on a large scale. Everyone saw that the ease with which degrees in philosophy, theology, and canon law were conferred by certain Italian institutions (for example, in some seminaries, the Doctorate in philosophy at the end of a two-year course, without anything like a real thesis) tended to bring all Roman degrees into disrepute. Five or six years ago there was serious question of one Roman university taking the lead, and adopting a standard more or less equivalent to that of the present papal *Constitution*; but that institution, whose requirements were already much higher than those of the majority of ecclesiastical faculties in Italy, hesitated about taking a step which was sure to give offense to other schools.

In the summer of 1930, the recently constituted Congregation of Studies, under the presidency of H. E. Cardinal Bisleti, appointed a commission of experienced educators to aid in drawing up a set of constitutions, which should hold for all degree-conferring bodies in the Church.² The commission met often and worked hard for many months, its labors resulting in the two documents above mentioned. It is not cynical praise to say that one of the best things about these documents is their brevity. While sketching clearly and firmly the general organization of the future ecclesiastical university, its course of studies, its minimum requirements for degrees, they wisely abstain from entering into details, and thus leave a good deal of latitude as to the mode of their application. They do not attempt the impossible task of reducing the higher schools of the Church all over the world to a dead level of strict uniformity. All institutions desiring to confer pontifical degrees were told to draw up their own particular statutes in conformity with the new

Constitution; and those wishing to begin giving such degrees at the end of the school year 1932-1933, the year in which the *Constitution* goes into effect, were required to present their statutes to the Congregation of Studies for approval before June 30, 1932. The present writer was a member of the committee that worked on a set of statutes destined to be adopted by a considerable number of Jesuit houses of study. Since this committee included two members of the original pontifical commission referred to above, its interpretation of the *Constitution* and *Ordinationes* may be assumed to be quite reliable. The statutes in question are not yet available in their final form; but on many points I can fall back on the common view of the committee.

The most obvious changes introduced by the new legislation are perhaps these two: (1) it lengthens considerably the period of study required for the various degrees,—the years of resident study in philosophy to at least four; (2) while by no means abandoning the traditional aims and methods of ecclesiastical schools, it broadens, and at the same time unifies the field of study in each department, emphasizes the cultivation of scientific habits of investigation, and insists that the student be trained to think and to study by himself. With a view to these ends specialized courses, seminars (*exercitationes practicae*), and written work of various kinds are prescribed.

THE COURSE IN PHILOSOPHY

Before entering upon a degree course in philosophy, the student must have completed the *curriculum medium studiorum classicorum*,—in France and Italy the *lyceum*; in Germany the *gymnasium*; it is more or less equivalent to our high school studies, plus a year or two of college. The *Ordinationes* (Art. 13) describe in a general way the sort of course contemplated. It includes Greek, and the natural sciences—a little more of the latter, perhaps, than is taught in our high schools, and less than we have in college. The studies of the program are divided into three groups: *principalia*, *auxiliaria*, and *specialia*, *peculiariora*. The *principal* branches are the traditional parts of scholastic philosophy (along with an introduction to the whole), and the history of philosophy. *Auxiliary* studies are scientific questions related to philosophy, experimental psychology, and interpretation of the texts of Aristotle and of St. Thomas. Such courses as sociology, education, the historical study of a certain problem or philosophical movement, are classed as *special*. All the principal, and all the auxiliary courses must be followed by degree students, for whom also a certain number of special branches is prescribed, and active participation in seminar work. These students must attend not less than two-thirds of

classes in each course, and pass an examination covering all the matter gone over in the same.

The authors of the *Constitution* seem to have had in mind a four-year course, so divided that during the first two years all the parts of scholastic philosophy would be treated in a way sufficient to prepare the student for a good degree in theology. The last two years would thus be reserved for advanced work: more difficult problems of scholastic philosophy, auxiliary and special courses, seminars, etc. That this two-two division was conceived as a normal thing follows from the fact that students not wishing to continue for the degree at once can advance in theology after their second year, and that seminarians who have completed the ordinary two-year course in an approved seminary can be admitted regularly into third year of the university course. However, in Jesuit scholastic schools that are not frequented by extern students, all the prescriptions of the pontifical documents can be met under a three-one division (that is, by retaining our old three-year program for the parts of scholastic philosophy). Although the question was discussed at great length by the committee that worked on the Jesuit *Statutes*, the general conclusion was that the decision should be left to the authorities of the individual schools, neither plan being imposed as obligatory on all. The two-two division has the advantage of ensuring attention to some of the most characteristic prescriptions of the papal *Constitution*: special classes, individual study, scientific method, seminars, etc. On the other hand, where there is a lack of competent professors able to take such work in hand and conduct it successfully, the result would probably be a greater delay than would follow from the three-one plan; the students in third year, without the dominating courses in metaphysics and ethics on which to concentrate, would find themselves hopelessly at sea.

Regarding class-hours, the following program would seem all in all just: about eight to ten hours of scholastic philosophy a week during the first two years, and from ten to eight during third year;³ a total of five or six semester hours of history of philosophy, ten of scientific subjects connected with philosophy, three or four of experimental psychology, four of texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas, two of special courses, one of seminar work—must be completed before the Licentiate, that is, before the end of third year. Scholastic disputations ("circles") have been made obligatory by the *Constitution* (30, par. 1, *Ordin.* 20), which says, also, that in fourth year *paucae sint paucae*, meaning about four to six a week.

DEGREES

The three degrees recognized are the Baccalaureate, Licentiate (M. A.), and Doctorate. The first need not be conferred at all; when given, it will come at the end of second year without other condition than the successful passing of the ordinary examinations. The Licentiate cannot be conferred before three years have been completed. Its requirements, briefly stated, are these: satisfactory examination in the various courses prescribed, a special oral examination covering all the parts of scholastic philosophy, one

written examination, a paper (*experimentum scriptum*) prepared in connection with some seminar, and approved by the professor who directs the seminar. Nothing further is said regarding the paper, excepting that it should give evidence of aptitude for scientific work (*Ordin.* 32, par. 1). The Doctorate cannot be conferred before the end of fourth year, one year after the Licentiate at the earliest. The candidate must present a dissertation, a portion of which will be published and copies sent to all the canonically erected faculties existing in the country.

It was remarked at the beginning of this paper that the new legislation affects ordinary seminaries in a serious way, though only indirectly. Such seminaries cannot confer degrees; but Article 9 of the *Constitution* implies that their professors must as a rule be *licentiati*. Hence, they will have to do at least one year of advanced work in a recognized university department. In like manner, faculties that can confer the Licentiate alone, are not self-propagating, since the majority of their professors must be doctors. It is therefore very necessary that in every country one or more faculties exist, which are fully equipped to confer both Licentiate and Doctorate.

EXAMINATIONS

The general principle is that candidates must be examined in each prescribed study. It is not said that they must pass all these separate examinations successfully. The latter observation is no mere quibble, since the final note which decides the candidate's fate is to be an "average," compiled from the results of all his examinations, written exercises, and seminar work (*Ordin.* 33). There may, therefore, be cases in which exceptional success in principal studies can "make up" for a failure in some secondary branch. The authors of the pontifical documents took for granted that the examinations would usually be oral.⁴ At the one-hour examination *de universa philosophia* for the Licentiate, at least four professors shall be present and give votes. Besides the public defense of his thesis, the candidate for the Doctor's degree must pass another special examination, which may consist either in the defense of a certain group of theses, or in the treatment of a problem from the particular field in which he has specialized. The doctorate examinations should be solemnized with as much academic pomp and ceremony as possible.

ONE OR TWO OBSERVATIONS

Nearly every one of these requirements is accompanied in the original legislation by the word *saltem* (at least); they constitute an irreducible minimum, with which individual schools are by no means obliged, nor even expected, to be content. It is probable, for example, that most Jesuit institutions will require, in practice, two years, after the Licentiate, for the Doctor's degree, though the second may not always be spent in residence. Monsignor Ruffini, secretary of the Congregation of Studies, who took a leading part in the drawing up of the new legislation, assured the present writer in conversation that the mind of the Congregation was to prescribe for the Doctorate one year of extra residence, after which the candidate

could take as much time in or out of residence as he found necessary to finish his dissertation.

A remark before closing about the chief obstacles likely to be encountered in the actual carrying out of the *Constitution*. I pass over the exceptional difficulty in Italy, arising from the deeply rooted traditions in the ecclesiastical schools of that country, as also the special difficulties that come up in this country from our partial dependence on certain outside standardizing agencies. First, then, in many places it will be hard to apply the law stipulating that all candidates for degrees shall have done previous courses in Greek, and in the various sciences enumerated in *Ordinations*, 13; this hardship will affect both religious and secular students in ways which it is left to the reader to conjecture. Secondly, the course in "scientific questions related to philosophy" is likely to create no small embarrassment. As a rule, neither our scientists nor our philosophers are adequately prepared to handle it, especially as (in the beginning at least) they will be without text-books that provide help and direction. There is danger lest it be quietly replaced by some such course in

science as has hitherto flourished in most of our philosophes, the old number of hours being gradually resumed. Thirdly, if the new regulations are to achieve their purpose, it will be absolutely necessary to carry into effect the article which prescribes the publication and distribution of a considerable part of each doctorate dissertation. When one remembers that this measure is of world-wide scope it takes no great perspicacity to discern the difficulties in the way of its application.

REFERENCES

¹ Pius XI, *Deus Scientiarum Dominus*.

² For the sake of brevity, I sometimes omit mention of such exceptions and qualifications as would mean little to the ordinary reader. Nor have I thought it necessary to multiply references to the pontifical documents. Finally, I confine myself to a discussion of the new legislation in so far as it affects the course in philosophy.

³ In the "two-two" plan, these third-year classes in scholastic philosophy would be devoted to special problems or to advanced courses in this or that treatise, and would be obligatory, since they belong to a *principal* study.

⁴ All oral examinations must be public, in the sense that any one wishing to attend may do so (*Ordin.* 34).

St. Thomas and the Universal Doubt

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MANY neo-Scholastics, among them Cardinal Mercier, Farges, Sentroul, and Jeannière declare that a universal doubt is the only possible solution of the critical problem.¹ Such neo-Scholastics assert that this solution of the question as to the Initial State of the mind in philosophical inquiry is more satisfactory than the solution offered by the rest of the Scholastics; and they maintain that their universal doubt is founded in Aristotle's advice "to doubt thoroughly," and in Thomas Aquinas' confirmation of the "universal doubt."

It is not my present purpose to consider the former assertion of the Louvain School; I do not propose either to criticize their Initial State, or to attempt a refutation of the arguments used by Mercier and his followers in favor of a universal methodic doubt. Nor do I insist at present, with Mercier's critics, that the illustrious Cardinal's theory leads to universal skepticism. My purpose is merely this: To put forth as clearly as possible the real meaning of the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas which have often been quoted and, I believe, misinterpreted by Mercier and his school. For a study of these texts will reveal that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas ever dreamed of advocating the use of universal doubt as a means of acquiring certitude. The Louvain authors, it would seem, have erred in founding their universal doubt on a misinterpretation of the texts which they quote. We may turn, then, to the texts themselves.²

Aristotle, having stated in the first book of his *Metaphysics* the different doctrines of his predecessors, begins

his second book with a criticism of these tenets. He piles up before himself all the difficulties arising from their opinions so as to bar his own way (*a-poros*). Purposely he puts himself in this trying position, and laboriously he works to clear a way through this maze of difficulties. He explains his method thus:

"For those," he says, "who wish to get clear of difficulties (*euporēsai*) it is advantageous to state the difficulties well (*diaporēsai kalōs*), because the subsequent free play of thought (*euporia*) implies the solution of previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot which one does not know. But the difficulty of our thinking points to a 'knot' in the object; for in so far as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward. Therefore one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand, both for the reasons we have stated, and because people who inquire without first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to go; besides, a man does not otherwise know even whether he has found what he is looking for or not. For the end is not clear to such a man, while to him who has first discussed the difficulties it is clear. Further, he who has heard all the contending arguments, as if they were the parties to a case, must be in a better position for judging."³

How should we interpret these texts? Mercier and his followers translate the words (*diaporesai kalos*) as meaning "to doubt thoroughly." This translation, however, is opposed by such Aristotelian scholars as J. A. Smith of Balliol, and W. D. Ross of Oriel College, who collaborated in the Oxford translation, and other scholars well versed in Aristotelian Greek. And not without rea-

for, "to doubt thoroughly" is a faulty translation of the words (*diaporesai kalos*). The Greek word (*aporia*) here means, not "doubt," "suspension," or "ignorance," as in the modern language, but rather "difficulty," "objection," and "obstruction." Aristotle does not say it is advantageous to "doubt thoroughly"; but he does say that it is important and necessary "to state the difficulties well." Is this advocating universal doubt? I think not. It is but the statement of an ancient truth, namely, that to solve a problem one must first know what the problem is and why it presents a difficulty. Aristotle teaches us to know as much as we possibly can before we attempt to discuss a subject; he counsels us to avoid no difficulties, to survey all possible objections. Mercier and his followers, however, thinking that doubt is the "fundamental law of scientific research," seem to overlook this natural interpretation of Aristotle's words. Following, then, the interpretation of reputable Aristotelian scholars, and judging the words by their natural meaning, I think that we must reject Mercier's interpretation and translate the words (*diaporesai kalos*) to mean "to state the difficulties well."

But how shall we interpret Aquinas' alleged confirmation of Aristotle's "doubt"? Mercier, Sentroul, Farges and others are unanimous in asserting that St. Thomas affirmed the universal doubt. In corroboration of their opinion they quote the following passage from his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*:

"Cujus ratio est, quia aliae scientiae considerant particularem de veritate: unde et particulariter ad eas pertinet circa singulas veritates dubitare: sed ista scientia sicut habet universalem considerationem de veritate, ita etiam ad eam pertinet *universalis dubitatio de veritate* (italics mine), et ideo non particulariter, sed simul universalem dubitationem prosequitur."⁴

Isolated from its context this passage might justly be taken to be a confirmation of Aristotle's "doubt." Of this possibility the Louvain School has made good use. We should remark, however, that this quotation is only a partial synopsis of the Aristotelian text which we discussed in the first part of this paper.

But there remains the question: Why did St. Thomas use the words "*dubitare*" and "*dubitatio*"? In writing his splendid commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* he did not use the original Greek text; for he did not know the language of Aristotle. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of his having had a knowledge of Greek grammar; there are, in fact, traces of such knowledge in his writings.⁵ For his commentary he used a Latin version made, at his urgent request, by his friend William Moerbeke, O. P., Archbishop of Corinth, a well known scholar, translator and philosopher and one of the most distinguished literary men of the second half of the thirteenth century. In confirmation of this we have the contemporary testimonies of Roger Bacon, dating from 1272, and of Bernard Gui, who writes: "*Frater Wilhelmus Brabancensis, transtulit omnes libros naturalis et moralis philosophiae de greco in latinum ad instantiam sancti Thomae.*"⁶ Further testimony with regard to the

assistance Moerbeke rendered to Aquinas is given in the life of St. Thomas published in the *Acta Sanctorum* where we read the following passage by William of Tocco: "... *super moralem et metaphysicam quorum librorum procuravit Aquinas ut fieret nova translatio quae sententiae Aristotelis contineret clarius veritatem.*"⁷ The use of Moerbeke's version is also confirmed by Bernard of Rubeis, O. P., in his book "*de gestis et scriptis ac doctrina Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, dissertationes criticae et apologeticae.*"⁸

In his translation of Aristotle William of Moerbeke translates the Greek word, *aporia*, by "*dubitatio*," and *diaporesai kalos* by "*dubitare bene*." Saint Thomas in his commentary prefers to retain the word "*dubitatio*." But, in view of his understanding of the term, the expressions: "*pertinet circa singulas veritates dubitare*" and "*universalis dubitatio*," ought to be translated respectively by "it is necessary to survey difficulties against each branch of philosophy," and "difficulties against the whole of philosophy."

What does Saint Thomas really mean by the above passage? He wishes only to point out to us the important roles which philosophical difficulties and objections must necessarily play at the beginning of metaphysics.

The whole tenor of his language is essentially this: Difficulties of the metaphysical order are not, as in the other sciences, limited to this or that realm of knowledge, but they are of an absolute, universal extension. The subject matter of philosophy, being universal, embraces therefore all reality, all that was, is, and can be; it includes everything: God and creatures, substance and accident, matter and form. We cannot cramp the field of philosophy; we cannot limit it. Philosophy is too extensive, too vital, too universal to admit restriction. Philosophy is more than mere dialectics; it is more than the science of thought; it is, as Paulsen says, "the sum-total of all scientific knowledge." It is an orderly inquiry into the ultimate causes of all things. And just as metaphysics is concerned with being and truth in itself (which are universal objects), so also discussions of those objects will be of a universal character. Therefore, Saint Thomas would say, we have to represent in a panoramic all-embracing view the obstacles that will beset us; we have to get a general conspectus and systematic arrangement of all actual and possible objections that will or may arise. Though philosophy seeks to synthesize all knowledge, while other sciences seek fractions of knowledge, yet the science of metaphysics does not inquire *whether* truth exists, but *what* truth is.

The confounding of "difficulties against each branch of philosophy" with "universal doubt" is the mistake committed by the Louvain authors. Isolated from their contexts these quotations are, of course, baffling; but, read in their proper places they sound most natural. If Saint Thomas, at the threshold of epistemology had really wanted to advocate universal doubt as a means to acquire certitude, he should and would certainly have shown us in the following pages how to get out of it. But he does nothing of the kind. Without paying any attention to a state of

universal doubt he at once sets himself to solving the general difficulties regarding being, substance and the other problems of metaphysics. This is a manifest proof that Saint Thomas never had the slightest doubt, real or negative, about the capability and trustworthiness of his intellect and its operations.

This paper, then, I hope, shall throw some light on these texts so often advanced by the Louvain School. These texts, they assert, are the foundation (sic) of their philosophical approach to the Critical Problem. But the Louvain interpretation is unwarranted; neither Aristotle nor Aquinas wished to begin epistemology with a universal doubt. On the contrary, the two leading philosophers of the Peripatetic School, in the very texts which the Louvain authors quote in support of their own theory, expressly reject universal doubt as a means of solving the Critical Problem. "They who do not inquire about difficulties," says Aristotle, "are like those who do not know where they have to go." But they who survey the difficulties see an opening through the mountains ahead; they have measured the breadth and length of the road, and they shall find their way out.

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² Much of the subject matter and form of expression of these

first paragraphs is drawn from Joseph de Tonquédec's *L critique de la connaissance*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1929; p. 437 ff.

³ Aristotle: Oxford Edition; v. viii, *Metaphysics*; bk. iii (B), ch. 1, 995a, 28. J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross Trans Oxford, 1908.

⁴ Aquinas, St. Thomas: *Commentaria in Metaphysicam*; iii L. 1.

⁵ Cf. Jourdain: *La philosophie de Saint Thomas*; tome p. 82.

⁶ Arch., Litt. u. Kirchengesh. Mitt. ii, 226.

⁷ March 1643; ch. 1; p. 665.

⁸ Aquinas, St. Thomas: Ed. Leon.; t. 1; dissert. 23, ch. 2 p. CCL ff.

(Editor's note.) This contribution in so far as it controverts an earlier article ("The Negative Doubt of the Louvain School," G. G. Grant, *Modern Schoolman*, March, 1932) turns on the correct rendition of certain Greek and Latin words. Whether the Greek "*aporia*" is correctly translated by the Latin "*dubitatio*" is one question. Whether either of these words is correctly translated by the modern "doubt," or whether it were better translated by "objection" or "difficulty" is another question. To complicate the situation Aristotle uses still another word, "*dulchereia*" (*Meta.* 995 a, 33), which Ross likewise translates "doubt." The *Modern Schoolman* has no wish to enter further on these etymological disputes. For us the philosophical question, historically considered, is: Did St. Thomas when, in pursuance of Aristotle's thought, he speaks of "*universalis dubitatio de veritate*," and more especially when he describes Heraclitus' state of mind (*Meta.* IV, L. 14, n. 709), really vision anything like the Cartesian method of doubting as the proper *initium philosophandi*.

The Ethics of John Dewey, Educator

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JOHN DEWEY'S remarkable influence is largely as an educator; but every educational system is based upon a philosophy of life. For, before we are to educate, as Maritain puts it, "we must first define the ideal of life that is to serve as a guide in the training of the intellect and the development of personality."¹ Friedrich Foerster, the well-known German educator, is no less emphatic when he insists that "the study of ideals is the most fundamental discipline of pedagogy."² DeHovre, in his *Philosophy and Education*, expresses the relation of education and philosophy tersely in these words: "Educational movements follow the flux and reflux of philosophical currents."³ Thus, the philosopher may presume to criticize Dewey the educator. And the philosopher is fortunate when he comes to study Dewey, because he not only expresses his philosophy of life implicitly in his pedagogical works, but explicitly in many philosophical treatises.

The great difficulty in Dewey's philosophy, however, is its lack of clarity. Wickham complains of this in *The Unrealists*. A more friendly critic, Herman Horne of New York University, has written a companion volume to Dewey's *Democracy and Education* precisely because he felt that Dewey's text was in need of clarification. Even

Dewey himself is aware of his own obscurities. But in spite of this difficulty under which the student of Dewey must labor, the general trend of at least one branch of his philosophy is unmistakable, namely, his ethics. And after all it is an educator's moral views that are of the greatest interest to the philosopher; for the goal of any system of education is morality, as Dewey expressly admits: "all the aims and values which are desirable in education are themselves moral."⁴

And what does morality mean to Dewey? The following quotations should leave no doubt in our minds as to the meaning of his moral notions. These expressions set forth with a clarity not characteristic of him, are the ever-recurring refrain whenever Dewey touches upon the question of morality.

"Ultimate moral motives," he says, "are nothing more or less than social intelligence and social power at work in the service of social interest and aims."⁵ "It is as true of progressive as of stationary society that the moral and the social are one."⁶ "Morals are as broad as acts which concern our relationship with others."⁷ "Customs in any case constitute moral standards."⁸ Dewey's description of

(Continued on page 46)

A Select and Classified Bibliography

Compiled for the librarians of Catholic seminaries and schools of philosophy, under the direction of Rev. Leo W. Keeler, Professor of philosophy at the Gregorian University, Rome. Works by Non-Catholics are listed apart, excepting those under History of Philosophy; such works, it is understood, are not recommended for indiscriminate reading by students. A few French and German books have been included.

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St. Thomas on Miracles

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THE study of miracles has always presented to the human race problems about which controversy does not cease, problems not without interest for the philosopher, the theologian, the man of science. Even to-day, men in every walk of life are debating the question with animosity. In view of this interest in miracles, especially strong at the present time, a study of St. Thomas Aquinas' doctrine on this point may be timely.

In any consideration of St. Thomas' doctrine on miracles several facts must be taken into account. First, it was not until comparatively recent years that scholastic scholars saw the need of determining whether or not St. Thomas' definition of the term "*miraculum*" could be applied consistently when subjected to the rigorous tests of philosophy. Secondly, every resurgence of the controversy over the Angelic Doctor's definition presents difficulties extremely perplexing. Authors are generally satisfied to ground their personal views, showing the conformity of their contentions to certain texts of Aquinas. Opinions have become so widely variant among Scholastics that one might fittingly ask upon what foundations the opponents have based their claims to the tradition and patronage of the Angelic Doctor.

We are not concerned with an enumeration of the many adjectives and adverbs used by St. Thomas to designate the miraculous. Nor are we concerned with his lengthy lists of expressions synonymous with the term "*miraculum*." We intend to discuss only his definition and certain questions arising therefrom. Because of the etymology of the word, St. Thomas comes to define a miracle as follows: "*Miraculum autem dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus.*"¹ Thus, according to the Angelic Doctor, a miracle is an event proceeding from a cause *simpliciter occulta*." This cause is God. St. Thomas is very explicit in postulating this extremely rigid definition of miracles. There can be no mistake about the meaning of his words. The effect produced, he says, must proceed from a cause surpassing the powers of all created beings.²

Many modern cosmologists, without investigating the true meaning St. Thomas wished to convey, have hesitated to accept so rigorous a definition. That they do so is the result of a wrong interpretation of the definition will become evident as we advance our treatise. Before proceeding let us make clear the statement of the question. We will assist us in our consideration of the difficulties we shall encounter in defending St. Thomas' phrase: "God is the sole cause of miracles." It will also enable us to grasp his true notion of a miracle.

There is no dispute among Scholastics about the ultimate cause of miracles. All admit that God is the ultimate principal cause of each and every miraculous event in so far as the miracle is done with His direct approval. Decidedly the dispute is whether, according to Aquinas' definition, God can employ an angel as an *instrumental* cause in the performance of miracles, or must Himself produce the miracle immediately. Now in case God does employ an angel as an instrumental cause, which possibility St. Thomas frequently admits, does He make use of the angel as a *physical* or *moral* instrument in producing the effect? In short, has the angel of himself effective physical power, so that all he needs is the mandate of God, or must God first elevate the physical powers of the angel to a higher efficiency in order that the miracle be worked?

If the definition of St. Thomas requires that God must Himself act directly on nature, or that the angel cannot with his own physical powers interfere in the course of nature, we have to face the following difficulty: Evil angels, St. Thomas and others admit, though not permitted to simulate the miraculous in all its circumstances, do nevertheless interfere with the course of nature. Therefore, it must follow that the good angels likewise have that power. In other words, if we say that God may use an angel as an instrumental cause, as St. Thomas says, and yet hold that He must first elevate the physical powers of the angel before he can work the miracle, then the same must be done for the bad angels when they interfere with the course of nature. Admitting the latter possibility would seem to involve the direct cooperation of God in an attempt at deception and falsehood. Thus, the only interpretation left in explaining the definition of St. Thomas, if it is to be preserved as a correct definition, is to say that the angel has by his own nature the physical power to produce the miracle and needs only the mandate of God. In this last explanation God merely permits the interference of the bad angel, but never to such an extent that the deception cannot be detected by man. But in the case of the good angel God can command the act as something willed by Himself.

Our task is to see whether certain texts taken from St. Thomas will bear this last explanation. His definition as it stands certainly does not give us enough information to enable us to say that he explained God's part in the working of miracles in this way. At first sight it would seem that, if we admit that angels, of their own power, can intervene in the operation of miracles, we thus aim a blow against the definition of St. Thomas; for the Angelic Doctor says that God alone can be the cause of miracles. It is our contention that allowance for the intervention by

angels, of their own power, always of course with God's permission, is a blow aimed not at the definition of St. Thomas, but rather at an interpretation of the definition which is not in conformity with his meaning.

Some authors, believing that Aquinas does require the physical intervention of God in the working of miracles (and this, we maintain, because they have misread his words: "God as sole cause") have actually endeavored to defend St. Thomas on this point. But that his definition does not require the physical cooperation of God in the production of miracles we shall now proceed to show. In so doing we shall take into consideration various texts of Aquinas which certain authors have used in their efforts to justify God's physical causality. We shall also consider those that seem to deny that St. Thomas postulated any such requirement on the part of God. The point at issue, let it be borne in mind, is not whether God *can* so elevate the physical powers of the angel, but rather whether or not He *must* do so whenever an angel should work a miracle.

Before proposing the arguments it will be well to observe that when modern authors speak of *physical* and *moral causality* they are not using words in exact conformity with the terminology of St. Thomas. This difference of terms, however, need not impede our attempt to weigh carefully the most important texts bearing on the dispute; for the *moral causality* spoken of by these authors does not differ essentially from the *intentional* or *dispositive causality* so frequently mentioned by Aquinas.

If according to the definition of St. Thomas the miraculous effect must proceed from "a cause surpassing the powers of all created beings," if this "*causa simpliciter occulta*," which is God only, can alone work miracles, and if the definition requires that God's causality constitutes an essential and fundamental notion of the miraculous, we are of the opinion that St. Thomas is referring to God only as the *ultimate principal* cause of miracles. Unless this be his meaning it seems very difficult to reconcile the definition with various other texts wherein he attributes certain events which he believes to be true miracles, to the action of angels.³ Then, too, it will be difficult to conform the definition to his more general principle that, if certain creatures cannot effect miracles as principal agents by the exercise of their own faculties, they can at least do so because of a particular divine impetus.⁴

Let us now pass in brief review the principal texts of St. Thomas which some authors say are arguments in behalf of St. Thomas' requiring the *immediate physical* causality of God in the working of miracles.

First, it is perfectly obvious that to translate "*aliquid coagendo*" and "*potestative ac cooperando miraculis*" by "physical cooperation" is to suppose what must be proved.⁵ The same can be said of St. Thomas' statement that, for each miraculous operation, the intermediary agent requires a new efficacy from the divine power.⁶ St. Thomas does tell us that a new efficacy is required, but he does not say in what this efficacy consists. The mere fact that a new efficacy is required does not warrant the

conclusion that it is of the physical order.⁷ Those who have attempted to prove that Aquinas postulates the necessity of God's physical causality have relied in great part upon these two texts for their arguments. They also tell us that St. Thomas compares the causality of the intermediary agent "*à la motion qui traverse l'instrument*." *De facto*, the Angelic Doctor more than once compares the causality with something in the physical world; but nowhere does he say that such references to the physical order of things make the instrumental causality of God belong to that order rather than the purely intentional. He is merely illustrating for the sake of clarity; but in so doing he says absolutely nothing about the causality of God being of the physical order.⁹

Perhaps one of the strongest arguments in favor of St. Thomas' admitting the necessity of God's physical cooperation is the fact that he admits that the infirm can often be cured by mere motion or bodily contact,¹⁰ or even by contact with inanimate objects.¹¹ However, the argument deduced therefrom loses strength when we realize that men and inanimate objects are only the occasion of the necessary intercessors for the performance of the miracle, and that the actual performance of such miracles is effected either by God, or by an angel with God's command. In case God does so choose to act directly on nature the entire argument falls wide of the mark, for the dispute is not whether God can work directly on nature with His immediate physical intervention, but rather, as we have already stated, whether He must do so in order that an angel be able to produce the effect. In our arguments showing that St. Thomas does not require God's physical intervention we shall see that there is no repugnance in admitting that such miracles performed by angel at the command of God can belong to the intentional order.¹²

These few arguments, which would make us believe that St. Thomas required the physical intervention of God, do nothing more than establish instrumental causality without designating its precise nature. Moreover, if we maintain that these texts affirm that St. Thomas postulated God's physical intervention, which we do not, we are involving him in the difficulties, already noted, concerning the interference of the bad angels with the course of nature. It seems hardly possible, we believe, to conclude that the Angelic Doctor did not sense the objection to which such an admission would lead. This explanation of his definition, at best, only pushes the difficulty back one step.

We find, on the other hand, several texts in which the Angelic Doctor indicates very strongly that angels are used by God only as moral instruments in the operating of miracles. Very often he tells us that angels, by the use of their own faculties, perform miracles, which nevertheless are of a lower order than those wrought by God directly.¹³ They are true miracles, he says, in so far as they are operated *in divina virtute*.¹⁴ In the *De Potentia* we read that the working of miracles "*per ministerium*" is within the powers of angels. He tells us explicitly that when miracles are effected "*ex potestate*," the command of

and is communicated to the subject by the angelic spirit.¹⁶ Thomas there says that the angel would have no efficiency for performing the miracle were it not for the fact that he is commanding the subject in the name of the creator. But he says nothing about this command of God elevating the powers of the angel to a higher physical efficiency. What is more, it is precisely in the imposing of this divine command upon the angel, according to St. Thomas, that the instrumental causality is constituted. But nowhere does he speak of this command of God bestowing special physical powers upon the intermediary agent.

If these few passages represent fairly well the thought of Aquinas in the matter of God's cooperation in the working of miracles (and the interpretation we have given them seems to harmonize quite perfectly with all the texts relating to the subject, even those employed by authors to establish the physical causality), we believe that it is far more scholarly to conclude that in his definition St. Thomas is speaking of God only, as the ultimate cause of miracles. In our explanation we have avoided an unnecessary and illegitimate transit from the intentional to the physical order by reserving to God the rôle of ultimate principal cause. It has saved St. Thomas' definition from the difficulty concerning the power of the bad angels, a difficulty which St. Thomas must surely have foreseen. But his texts do not permit an absolute interpretation to be admitted by all. The dispute has resulted in a terminology somewhat at variance with that of the Angelic

Doctor; but we do believe that the interpretation we have given his definition is far nearer the truth than the arguments advanced in favor of the physical causality. The latter arguments seem to us devoid of all foundation.

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- ¹¹ 1a 2ae, q. 102, art. 5 ad 7; 2a 2ae, q. 178, art. 1 ad 1.
- ¹² Van Hove, A.: *La doctrine du miracle chez Saint Thomas*; Paris, 1927. Cf., pp. 155-157 for a refutation of the arguments in support of the physical causality.
- ¹³ *Contra Gent.*; I. III c. 103; *De Pot.*; q. 6, art. 5.
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Humanism and Social Science

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HERE is a strange contrast between the reactionary thought of certain prominent men of letters and the philosophy that has held sway in the field of social science for the last hundred years. Though the triumph of materialism in the nineteenth century had its effect in all departments of life and left its imprint quite naturally on the current literature, its influence was felt particularly in those sciences that concern themselves chiefly with man, namely, sociology and psychology. Though we may differ in estimating its true value, and deplore its results, we cannot but recognize that in its varying forms materialism was the dominant system of the time. As we shall see, its history and that of the social sciences were very closely related. The physicist and chemist thought in its terms; the biologists after Huxley found it a powerful supplement to their theories. Those tendencies in contemporary letters that aroused the Humanists to vigorous and partly successful protest are symptoms of a toxic condition in the social organism that began to be felt a century ago.

Oddly enough, the philosophy that sanctions *laissez faire* or individualism in business life can be traced rather

definitely to another humanism, that of the fifteenth century in Italy and in the north. As we must go to Rome for the matrix of western life, so we must turn to the economic and religious ferment which accompanied the new learning, in order to discover the birthplace of what we may call the systems of modern thought. Liberalism in politics, the sentimentalism of Rousseau, the materialism of the nineteenth century, all were there in seed if not in maturity; and more clearly defined was the importance placed upon the individual, his freedom from authority, and the first denials of the supernatural order, later to be made more comprehensive. In those troubled times the new way of life which we have inherited was formed in all its essentials. Its seeds were planted. And if the new religion of negation maintained a high standard of morality until quite recently, when its authority began to weaken, the fruit of the new philosophy in the world of business, in law, banking, social justice, public charity, education, was felt almost from the first in a manner we must call pernicious.

Hence, we find Smith teaching the righteousness of the

individual's effort when in conflict with that of society,¹ a doctrine which led in time to that sanctification of the business man which Aldous Huxley calls the great sin of Protestantism. Indeed, it was in the revolt from spiritual authority that these principles found a status and a justification; for only in a society used for three centuries to the supernatural determinism of Calvin could the concept of biological determinism, and the social determinism to which it led, have struck the deep roots it has. When the scientists of the nineteenth century crowned the work of a long chain of thinkers, among them Locke, Hume, Smith and Ricardo, with the theories that viewed man both as a higher form of the ape and as a highly complex machine, they opened the doors wide to an era that applied their theories to the criminal, the child, and the poor. The philosophers, whether they wished it or not, had given an excuse to the industrialist who, between the year 1770, when James Hargreaves invented the spinning-jenny, and the time when the atrocious conditions of the working men brought about the reforms of 1832, had wrung wealth from the working men. And now the scientist gave sanction to that part of the population which had tired of the old morality.

Into this world so torn with theories that denied the humane in man Auguste Comte brought his idea of a science of man. A mankind good by nature, such as Rousseau had postulated before him, could be explained and moulded by scientific laws, he thought, and he embodied his theory in his *Cours de philosophie positive*, built up between 1830 and 1842. In that work the pupil of Saint-Simon proposed to make government a technical science and politics a profession. He looked forward to the time when legislation based on a scientific study of human nature should assume the character of natural law.²

"It [the existing social science] represents the social action of man to be indefinite and arbitrary, as was once thought in regard to biological, chemical, physical and even astronomical phenomena, in the earlier stages of their respective sciences. . . . We have seen what are the chaotic effects of such a strife; and we shall find that there is no chance of order and agreement but in subjecting social phenomena, like all others, to invariable material laws, which shall, as a whole, prescribe for each period, with entire certainty, the limits and character of political action."³

It is not difficult to see how sociology, which began as a means of reducing history to a science, later tried to reduce all human action to the same level, nor how useful to it would be the biological theory that man is a machine determined by merely natural laws. Comte realized the need of an investigation of society with the methods of physical science. It was a magnificent step forward, one that might have led to great social progress had it been united to a definite ethical system. But the postulates that system would have laid down, such as the freedom of the will, responsibility of a man for his moral acts, Comte was determined to reject in favor of the principles he hoped to find in a study of man himself. The point is significant. It explains the inability of the new scientists to secure agreement in the fundamental matter of first principles or

to establish a definite working program, an inability so marked that Professor Lester Ward, reviewing the work of Comte and Spencer, calls sterile all sociology which preceded his own. Professor Hornell Hart has this to say:

"Unanimity is strikingly absent. Ward enumerates eleven fundamentally different conceptions of sociology and then proceeds to adopt a twelfth of his own. Lack of unanimity in conclusions has been even more striking. The radical difference of opinion between Comte and Ward on the proper status of women and between Ward and Spencer on the desirability of war and of public education are classic examples."⁴

With Spencer, whose *Principles of Sociology*, a compilation based on materials collected by assistants, appeared in 1893, biological determinism and social utilitarianism entered into social theory. It is not surprising that the age of Darwin, which had found such satisfaction in discovering an animal ancestry for man, and, despite the testimony of the microscope, held with Huxley the theory of human origin from "primeval ooze," should, in applying its science to sociology, bring with it into the field of human action a thorough denial of the existing moral values. Such in synthesis was the work of Spencer, who elaborated by physical processes the explanation of man's morals and customs, his religious feelings, tendencies and aspirations.⁵ His doctrine is "nothing more than the materialistic theory of evolution applied to the domain of ethical life." Starting from the evident phenomenon of adaptation of life to environment, Spencer makes all conduct an effort either to help or to hinder adaptation, good in so far as it promotes adjustment, bad in its failure to do so. Good conduct, therefore, produces pleasure, bad conduct pain, certainly as succinct an outline of moral dogma as modern hedonism could desire. For Spencer the ultimate test of morality was the happiness and welfare of the group.⁶ This is the doctrine we call social utilitarianism or altruism, common to Bentham, Comte, the Mills, Fichte and Paulsen. Naturally, the sanction of such a system—the good of the community—is not of the kind that will endure when it conflicts with private interest.

The havoc wrought by the doctrine of Haeckel and Buchner so tersely expressed in the phrase, "nothing is except matter," has been felt as keenly in social philosophy as in letters and the arts. We see its effects in a new concept of the value of the life of man, of the criminal's natural rights, of certain highly unnatural practices that "are becoming part of our mores." The doctrine involves negation not merely of a spiritual value but of the individual as well. Stimulus and response, to pass on to behavioristic psychology, would explain away all that distinguishes man from the brute or the machine, postulating that there is neither moral sanction nor moral responsibility in what was once known as conscience and guilt. Given certain stimuli (among which sex and hunger are naively predominant), crime is as inevitable as virtue under other conditions. Mental operations, too, are denied their supra-material character, and *Thanatopsis* loses half its wonder in ceasing to be the product of an individual genius. In the theory of Lombroso, environment and congenital defects—not will, or the lack of it—make the criminal.

us, we have the mawkish sentimentality which distorts our treatment of the criminal, and the eager haste with which zealots push the practice of sterilization, while other investigators are rejecting Lombroso's doctrine. To quote only one of the latter's followers:

"Nature in its human form, it is now recognized, is physically reducible along with other forms of natural phenomena to movements between electro-proton systems. . . . Human behavior in the final analysis is a function of the sensori-cerebral motor mechanism in the same way that walking is the function of the legs and breathing the function of the lungs. . . . To assume there are psychical processes or selves, or a conscious or free will which controls the behavior of an individual is to introduce magic or miracles into the science of human behavior. . . . Man is no more 'responsible' for becoming willful and committing a crime than the flower for becoming red and fragrant. In both instances the end products are predetermined by the nature of protoplasm and the chance of circumstances. Personality . . . is a system of more or less integrated body habits."⁷

In short, the study of man has become a vast welter of conflicting opinions attached to no permanent theory of life. There is concert of a kind existing, to be sure, a tacit agreement to deny man the very qualities that make him human; but even this common ground is too frequently destroyed by man's refusal to abide by the portion allotted to him.

In this world of conflict Humanism has recently made a new appearance. As a universal philosophy it may have a solution to more than one of the questions confronting society, solutions as radical and effective as its antidote for literary decadence. Thus far Humanism has been too busy setting its own house in order to give more than such passing attention to social problems as we find in Gorham Munson's *The Dilemma of the Liberated*.⁸ We do find in More's *Aristocracy and Justice* a defence of capitalistic economics and of private property:

"The security of property is the first and all essential duty of a civilized community";
and a definition of social justice:

" . . . such a distribution of power and privilege, and of property as the symbol and instrument of these, as at once will satisfy the distinction of reason among the superior, and will not outrage the feelings of the inferior."

The definition here quoted, though somewhat free, shows a definite stand for a just balance such as does not exist to-day in the economic world. I cannot agree with Munson, from whom the quotations are taken,⁹ that More's definition is weak because it defends capitalism, as he says, or property, as More says. The two are by no means identical. If anything is human in man it is his tendency, founded on natural law, to cling to property. Certainly if the Humanists follow Mr. More in this matter they engage another adversary; besides the naturalist literature they must then confront the Socialist in economics.

But we can determine what the social program of Humanism would be from a study of the principles Humanists have expressed many times in the past three years.¹⁰ These principles we might state thus: Humanism is a reac-

tion to the monist fallacy; it asks for man a destiny higher than any which mere natural prosperity may bring; consequently it postulates a dualism of spirit and matter, and requires a discipline of nature through the "nothing too much" of the Greeks. Being a philosophy, it lacks authority and achieves its aims only through an appeal to the higher nature of man for self-government and purposive existence. A divine Being may or may not be one of its postulates and the problem of grace is left untouched; but, though the Humanists have come to no accord on the matter, we see among them a general tendency to follow out the logical consequences of their postulates.

To a society fed for nearly a century on the dry straw of scientific thought this is refreshing food indeed. It is a long step away from a theory of life that tends more and more toward the denial in theory and practice of the finer qualities in man. No doubt moralists who understand the essential weakness of human nature and the need of all men, particularly the poor and the uneducated, for a strong and definite standard of conduct will object that Humanism may fall into Comte's great error of turning secondary principles into primary, of building, that is, a way of life sufficient to itself which would look to no end beyond.

We can only hope, however, that soon the same respect for moral and physical realities that the Humanists have introduced into literature and criticism, the same enthusiasm for the high character of man's soul, will find its way into the sciences and particularly into social science. It is high time that the sway of materialistic philosophy be broken. We cannot look upon Lombroso or Spencer or Comte and their followers as benefactors of humanity. They have done much toward giving us a knowledge of man, his nature and his history, but the work they have advanced by physical investigation and research, they have retarded and hopelessly confused by refusing to recognize man's higher destiny and his dual nature.

We look to the day when a New Humanism will arise among sociologists, bringing with it a far more humane and logical view of man than the one which now prevails.

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other exponents of the new morality, so too, He has no place in religion. Drake asks this question in his work, *Seekers After God*:

"Are we going to abandon religion in the ardor of our new tasks? Are we to turn with renewed zeal to religion but free it more and more from theolatriy [i. e., God-worship]? Or are we perhaps at the verge of a great new vision of God, which shall lead us into ways that it hath not entered into our hearts to conceive?"⁷

Religion without God is a contradiction—it is a human body without a spine, a human being without a soul. The "new vision of God" represents the fluid concept of the deity, "a God in the making," and gives the infinite changeless First Cause and Creator less reality and stability than a mortal, changeable creature of God.

What Drake thinks of religion is paralleled by his views on the ten commandments.

"Take the Ten Commandments. . . . One such decalogue, cherished by that patriotic little Semitic tribe, the Hebrews, and supposed to have been handed down by their national god, Yahweh, to their mythical hero, Moses, has been taken over by Christianity and is still taught in thousands of churches as the literal commands of God to man."⁸

One could hardly characterize this reference to the ten commandments, which are an expression of the natural law as well as the divine positive law, as objective writing. It is similar to the oft-repeated statement of Bertrand Russell that monogamic marriage is based on sentimentality and will die out and that the responsibilities of the father will be turned over to the State. Russell, another apostle of the new morality creed needs to be reminded of the fact that the moral law and not sentimentality protects the unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond and that over 400,000,000 people look upon the moral law, protecting monogamy, as sacred and inviolable because it is divine. When Drake speaks of actions that are intrinsically right or wrong he correctly judges such actions as good or bad independently of the divine will: "No voice from without, even of a Creator and Ruler of the universe, could . . . make right other than right, or wrong other than wrong."⁹ Scholastic philosophy, too, admits that there are some actions that do not derive their goodness or malice from any will human or divine. What Drake fails to see is that law adds something to morality, namely, strict obligation imposed by the divine will of the Lawgiver upon the human will of man, the subject of the moral law, to do actions of one kind and to avoid actions of the other kind.

Bernard Shaw, another herald of revolt, looks upon loyalty to ideals and principles as self-murder. He styles it the foe of progress: "Every step of progress means a duty repudiated and a scripture torn up."¹⁰ Shaw would have little patience with Dr. Felix Adler who, in his book, *Marriage and Divorce*, insists that husband and wife have the duty of never getting a divorce, no matter what a dire mistake the marriage may have been. Adler does not accept the definition of ethics given in *The Public Conscience* by S. C. Cox: "It is a study of what is rather than of what ought to be."

The New Morality gets in its deadly work especially in the realm of sex. Rev. Jones Corrigan, S. J., justly censures Eugene O'Neill, Judge Lindsey, H. L. Mencken, Margaret Sanger, Sinclair Lewis and Bernard Shaw as prophets of the gospel of immorality:

"The so-called New Morality, advocated by these worthies, . . . eliminates moral restraint, strives to make vice virtue, and by granting license in sex relations creates servitude to human passions. . . . The New Morality, with its rejection of law and moral restraint, is the enemy of our national life."¹¹

Ellen Key's *Love and Marriage* serves as a primer for all those who are interested in the reform of marital life and sexual morality. Dr. Frederick Foerster says of her:

"Her 'new morality' consists essentially in the elimination of loyalty from the sphere of sex relations and the liberation of erotic feeling from every other consideration. The fundamental principle of the new order is that love and marriage must always coincide; when erotic passion fades, or when a new love swims into the horizon, then a marriage has lost its justification and must give way to new relationships."¹²

Dr. Havelock Ellis in his work on *Sex and Society* maintains that a constant change of values is taking place: "What at one time served as a standard of morality eventually becomes immoral, and vice versa." He goes so far as to maintain that the conduct of a young wife, who becomes estranged from her husband and then lavishes her affections upon another man passionately loved, can be "perfectly chaste."

Avis Carlson thus refers to traditional morality:

"So the code of dogmatic, arbitrary partition of right from wrong, inherited, no doubt, from the ancient Hebrews with their tabulated Thou Shalt's and Thou Shalt Not's, was incorporated into the Christian religion. . . . Unless the boy is not particularly social and unless he is made of rather tough, unyielding fiber, he will, somewhere near the end of his high school or the beginning of his college days, chuck out the right-and-wrong standard."¹³

The writer adds that she knew only a few students who went through four years of a state university without revising their moral standards. In finishing this study of the New Morality as compared with the traditional morality one feels inclined to say that wisdom smiles at "the last to lay the old aside" rather than at "the first by whom the new is tried."

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BOOK REVIEWS

EVOLUTION AND RELIGION

By the Rev. John A. O'Brien, Ph. D.

The Century Co., New York, 1932, \$2.50

Philosophers and theologians should appreciate Father O'Brien's popular exposé of some of the arguments for teleology and purpose, though it is possible that they will not always agree with them. The author devotes 88 pages to the philosophical implications of "Mechanism and Purpose" and to a study in teleology of life drawn mainly from some of the phenomena of generative adaptation. Mechanism, in denying a mechanist, commits philosophic suicide. The mechanical theory is a contradiction in itself if it denies the dualism of God and creature, mechanist and machine.

The author states that whether one holds the evolution of species or the fixity of species, one must admit God as the Designer and the One Who has implanted in living matter the complex laws by which it is governed. In short, not every theory of evolution is incompatible with Catholicism. The objections drawn from the Bible against any scientific theory or theory are usually worthless, since the Bible is not, and was not intended to be a text-book of science.

As regards the supposed evolution of man's body, the author writes: "In causing the body of man to be evolved from lower stages of animal life, and then, when the physical organism had reached an appropriate stage of neurological development and a capacity, infusing into it a spiritual and immaterial principle called the human soul, God would be the Creator just as if He had caused man to spring forth suddenly full-grown from the dust of the earth."

Scientists in talking about evolution as a "law or principle of nature" should not deny that it is but a tentative conclusion which may be modified or even rejected with the lapse of time. In the language of the philosopher, it is nothing more than a theory or hypothesis.

Father O'Brien arrives at a number of conclusions in the course of his book which readers will not find it easy to accept. His thesis of the first chapter of Genesis might well be questioned by Scripture scholars. Then, too, there are probably some scientists who would not hold with him that evolution is as fully established as the molecular theory or Newton's laws of motion and gravitation.

T. E. YOCH.

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY AND THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES

By the Rev. R. G. Bandas

With an introduction by the Rev. J. S. Zyburg
Bruce Publ. Co., Milwaukee, 1932

The student of philosophy to-day faces a strange problem, one which he must solve for himself. There exist two distinct philosophical traditions utterly isolated from one another. On the one hand he sees a revived Scholasticism going back enthusiastically to St. Thomas, and on the other the great mass of non-scholastic philosophy which shows its indubitable affiliation with Kant. The adherents of the one tradition seem almost oblivious of the existence of the other. Each has its own problems, its own terminology and its own solutions. The student feels that he should be fully acquainted with both traditions; but there is no one to unravel the mystery for him.

Father Bandas attempts to point the way for the solution of this perplexing problem, to enable the student of one tradition to understand the doctrines of the other. He is broad-minded and

far-sighted enough to see the need of a reconciliation of Scholasticism with non-scholastic philosophy. Too long have the Scholastics ignored everything which is not of their own production. Too long have the great majority of our own professors, to the distress of their ambitious students, considered all non-scholastic philosophy as so much nonsense. The same is true of the other tradition. But, true to the spirit of St. Augustine, who went out to take what was good in neo-Platonism, and true to the spirit of St. Thomas, who could recognize the good in Averroes and Moses Maimonides, Dr. Bandas has gone out to meet the non-scholastic philosophers in a sympathetic spirit. Scholasticism must meet such men as Russell, Whitehead, Bergson, Husserl, Croce and Gentile, not with an antagonistic attitude, but with an open and sympathetic mind. Dr. Bandas has pointed the way for such future endeavors.

In this book he attempts to show the relation of Thomism to contemporary philosophy. Each chapter has two parts, one presenting the views of contemporary philosophers, and the other the corresponding scholastic doctrine. In this way he is able to show clearly what the two have in common and how they differ. Such a form of presentation also enables the student of one tradition to understand the doctrines of the other tradition—the first condition necessary for any reconciliation between the two. Dr. Bandas treats successively Fundamental Principles, Idealism and New Realism, Philosophy of Becoming, Philosophy of Organism, Philosophy of Value, Humanism, and concludes with three chapters on God and Religion.

One may disagree with Dr. Bandas in many points, both in the presentation of contemporary philosophy and in his explanation of St. Thomas; but in general the book deserves wholehearted approval, and is valuable for scholastic and non-scholastic philosophers alike. Especially does Dr. Bandas point out the correct result to be obtained from a study of the history of philosophy. A study of this subject for its own sake leads to scepticism, but a constructive and critical reading of the history of philosophy is necessary both to broaden our minds and open the way for the reception of what is best in contemporary philosophy and to achieve that final synthesis of Scholasticism and modern thought towards which the neo-scholastic movement has ever striven.

W. L. WADE.

PERSONALITY AND WILL

By Francis Aveling, D.Sc., Ph.D.

D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1931, \$2.00

Dr. Aveling sets his problem before the reader thus: "It is the purpose of the present volume to investigate the nature of will and personality. . . . The investigation is, on the whole, experimental, not speculative." He sums up his discussion of the relation between the will and personality when he defines a person, in the strictest meaning of the term as "an individual incommunicably existing in himself, who is not merely will, or energy elicited by goals and determined by motives, but an intelligent will contemplating means to ends and making its own motives." This definition gives a key to his treatment of personality. It is not the study of the abstract concept of an inert being, but the study of personality as it is apprehended by consciousness, something concrete and dynamic. The author shows conclusively that personality, taken in this sense, both in its apprehension and in its nature, is largely a matter of will-acts.

Dr. Aveling evidently appreciates the work done by the psychologists of the various schools, and his treatment of those whose conclusions he cannot concede is fair and generous.

The book will be as gratifying to rational psychologists as it is stimulating to experimental psychologists. The scholastic doctrines of freedom of the will, unity of consciousness, and substantiality of person are insisted upon in no uncertain language. It is interesting to observe that the author expounds these doctrines in the language of experimental psychology, and uses its methods almost exclusively. Implicit in this mode of treatment is testimony to the wholesome truth that the true experimental psychologist must have a grasp of the principles of rational psychology, while the true rational psychologist must be familiar with the findings of experimental psychology.

This book will be a valuable addition to its sister volumes in the *Contemporary Library of Psychology*.

F. J. O'REILLY.

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what he calls "the good moral character" may well be taken as a summary of his ethical concepts:

"The genuinely moral person is one, then, in whom the habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is formed and active. Such an one forms his plans, regulates his desires, and hence performs his acts with reference to the effect they have upon the social groups of which he is a part. He is one whose dominant attitudes and interests are bound up with associated activities. Accordingly he will find his happiness in the promotion of these activities irrespective of the particular pains and pleasures that accrue."⁹

Passages could be multiplied which make morality point to the single aim, the social good. Maritain aptly says: "Every educator worships a deity; for Dewey it is society."¹⁰ The name of God scarcely appears in Dewey's *Ethics*. Neither is there any place in his system for the spiritual, eternal, and universal values. It is only with derision that they are so much as mentioned.

Thus, the scholastic philosopher finds the ethics of Dewey insufficient and false. For, in the mind of the Schoolmen, man has other obligations and duties besides those consequent upon the exigencies of society; his supreme end in life is individual; his main purpose is to fulfill his personal destiny by working out the will of God as it is manifested to him. The obligations which society exacts are but secondary, and are bereft of any meaning unless referred to the primary end of man's existence. No system of morality is sound which is not reared upon the bed-rock foundation of the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the existence of God, and the consequent creaturehood of man. Indeed, how can one determine man's correct course of action through life unless one has previously determined correctly the nature of man and the supreme purpose of his existence?

When we find Dewey wanting in such fundamental notions we are tempted to ask ourselves why he did not keep his hands off the moral question entirely. The answer is simple and obvious: Dewey cannot waive the moral question. Like many modern philosophers he can attempt to construct a psychology without a soul, a cosmology without the Creator, but he cannot frame an ethics without

morality. Morality is the skeleton in the closet for all the modern revolutionary philosophers. They have no scruple in completely rejecting as something outworn and sterile, the metaphysical heritage bequeathed to us by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. But they are less iconoclastic with moral values. For morality is too pressing a necessity of our daily life; without it civilization becomes the jungle. Consequently, they would destroy the foundations upon which our civilization has been built, yet would they keep the superstructure as the only habitation worthy of man.

Thus, pragmatic motives alone are the foundation of most of our modern systems of ethics; and Dewey, though he dislikes the appellation, cannot escape being classed as a pragmatist. Let us, then, deal with Dewey, the Pragmatist, in a pragmatic manner. It is true, of course that every philosophical system is built on metaphysics, even though its founder may abhor the very mention of the word as a meaningless abstraction. It is equally true that every system stands or falls on its metaphysics. But, waiting the metaphysical, let us inquire of Dewey, the Pragmatist, whether his ethical system is a good working principle which as such can satisfy the heart of man.

It would be unfair and untrue to arraign Dewey as a revolutionist who aims at abolishing all our moral institutions; nothing in his life or explicit teaching warrants such a charge. If, then, we were to ask Dewey why he believes in leading a good moral life, his answer that "it is something for which man must be good is capacity to live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what he contributes," could be taken as a sincere pronouncement. Society has been generous with Dewey; he therefore does not find it irksome to dedicate to it a good moral life. This attitude of mind probably is the key-note to Dewey's great popularity; to those who have relinquished the eternal values Dewey gives something to live for. This may be all well and good for those who have been chosen as society's darlings; the appeal to the natural tendency of gratitude which is rooted so deeply in the heart of man may be motive enough to lead them to lead lives free from the grosser evils at least. But can such a sanction support even these favorites of society when they come face to face with the crises of life?

Furthermore, when we come to apply the social concept of morality to the millions of the less fortunate members of society, then its inadequacy becomes manifest. For what do many get from "living with others" except injustice? If morality is to mean nothing more than a striking of the balance of the social give-and-take, what can we expect of those who have endured "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" to contribute to society? If the social is to be the *summum bonum* of the "good moral character," how can Dewey reasonably expect the starved members of society to seek their happiness in promoting the social welfare, "irrespective of the particular pains and pleasures that accrue"? Any system of morality that offers the goods of this life as its sole sanction is asking too much of frail humanity. The poor, the oppressed

suffering find the struggle of life arduous enough, even a buoyed up by the certain assurance that victory eventuate in the happiness of a future life where tears wiped away and sorrows are turned into everlasting

But replace that hope of the eternal days with the greater rewards doled out in this life, and millions will give up the struggle altogether.

Dewey appreciates this difficulty of sanction: "It is said to derive moral standards from social customs is to equate the latter of all authority." Thus he puts the question; and this is his attempt to answer it:

"What authority have standards which have originated in this way? What claim have they upon us? In one sense the question is unanswerable. In the same sense, however, the question is unanswerable whatever origin and sanction is ascribed to moral obligations and duties. Why attend to metaphysical and transcendental ideal realities even if we concede they are the authors of moral standards? Why do this if I feel like doing something else? Any moral question may reduce itself to this question if we so choose. But in an empirical sense the answer is simple. The authority is that of life. Why employ language, cultivate literature, acquire and develop science, sustain industry, and submit to the refinements of art? To ask these questions is equivalent to asking: Why live? And the only answer is that if one is going to live one must live a life of which these things form the substance."¹¹

"Why live?" That is exactly the question which Professor Dewey should answer. I cannot believe that he is an advocate of wholesale suicide. But, if the "be-all and end-all" is "here, upon this bank and shoal of time," then suicide is the logical response to human failure. Then life becomes an enigma; the opposing forces of desire for personal happiness and of the demands of the moral law, which struggle for supremacy in the heart of man, are fated to an irreconcilable combat.

Mr. Dewey's earnest desire to promote social progress is a aim praiseworthy in itself. But his ideal is one-sided. Horrifying as he does all forms of dualism, Dewey fails to appreciate the antagonism that exists between the individual and society. That antagonism the renowned sociologist, Benjamin Kidd, does not hesitate to express in these words: "The interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable."¹² Yet, Dewey and the Socialists generally attempt to establish a harmony between these two warring elements by identifying the interests of the individual with those of society. Individualism had previously attempted a harmonious ending by taking the opposite course, by reducing all the activities of life to the individual welfare.

Both solutions miss the mark because of their one-sidedness. One, and only one, philosophy of life can bring about harmony. It is the philosophy which is the life-giving of the greatest social force the world has ever seen. This philosophy brings order out of the chaos by going beyond society and beyond individuals that constitute it. It brings man face to face with God as his First Cause and End. It makes God the center of society by uniting

each individual of society with Him. Man, related thus to God, is raised to his fullest dignity as a man and becomes a brother to his fellow man. Then society takes on a deeper and more sacred meaning. Then the sacrifices which life in society demands of the individual are rationalized and ennobled. Such is the social ethics which is the foundation of the philosophy of education by which Friedrich Foerster has combated the absolutism and materialism of Germany. Such a social ethics, and not the emptiness of the philosophy of John Dewey, can alone save democratic America.

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